The elasticity of aggregate supply is one key to understanding the degree to which policyinduced increases in demand for biofuel feedstocks or agricultural CO 2 offsets will result in higher prices or expanded supply. In this paper we report land supply elasticities for the United States and Brazil estimated directly from the observed changes in cropland and estimated changes in expected returns. The resulting aggregate implied land-use elasticities with respect to price are quite inelastic in the United States and more elastic in Brazil (0.007-0.029 and 0.382-0.895, respectively). However, with pasture land included in Brazil, implied elasticities become much less inelastic (0.007-0.245).
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Background
The extent to which land will be converted from forests and pasture into crops has become one of the most important issues facing U.S. agriculture. The concern is that increased demand for biofuels will lead to deforestation, thereby negating part or all of the CO 2 reduction associated with replacing fossil fuels (Searchinger et al. 2009; Fargione et al. 2008 ). More recently, proposals to allow U.S. agriculture to participate in a cap-and-trade program limiting greenhouse gas emissions by providing offsets from tree planting (Brown et al. 2010 ) have raised fears that agricultural production will shift overseas, thereby increasing deforestation rates.
Estimates of the impact of biofuels and offset programs all hinge on how much land will be brought into production in response to policy-induced price increases.
Estimating the acreage response to price has a long history in agricultural economics. Houck and Ryan (1972) studied the acreage response of corn from 1948 to 1970. They examined three different groups of variables affecting planted corn acreage: government policy, market influence, and other supply determinants. The price of corn from the previous crop year was used as one of the variables representing the market influence group. Over the years, additional variables have also been used to explain the change in agricultural land use. These variables include output price relative to a variable input price index (Lee and Helmberger 1985; Tweeten and Quance 1969) , expected price (Gardner 1976) , acreage value (Bridges and Tenkorang 2009) , and expected net returns (Chavas and Holt 1990; Davison and Crowder 1991) . Davison and Crowder argue that using expected net returns to explain acreage decisions is better than using price alone because net returns account for changes in input prices.
Although there is a large body of literature examining farmers' acreage response, most studies focus primarily on specific crops or specific regions. To our knowledge, few studies report the acreage elasticity at the country level. One example is the acreage elasticity with respect to price in the United States by Tweeten and Quance (1969) . The aggregate acreage elasticity is crucial for understanding how a change in crop returns will affect deforestation rates because use of crop-specific acreage elasticities will infer high conversion rates.
Aggregate crop supply elasticities are used by two of the models used by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Air Resources Board (CARB) to determine the amount of indirect land use associated with biofuels regulations. GTAP, the model used by CARB, uses a U.S. cropland supply elasticity to calibrate its elasticity of land transformation (Ahmed, Hertel, and Lubowski 2008) . The U.S. and Brazilian components of the FAPRI (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute) modeling system, used by EPA, also use aggregate crop supply elasticities. The U.S. model (FAPRI 2004) uses an aggregate elasticity to allow decoupled payments to influence total agricultural acreage. The Brazil model uses an aggregate elasticity as a first step in determining crop-specific regional acreage responses to price changes.
We calculate aggregate land-use elasticities directly by dividing the observed change in aggregate acreage by an estimate of the change in expected net returns. For the United States, expected net returns include expected returns from those government programs that affect farmers' acreage response (Chavas and Holt 1990) . Expected net returns also account for changes in costs over time. To convert the elasticity of land use with respect to expected net returns into a price elasticity, we multiply by the elasticity of expected net returns with respect to price (Lin et al. 2000) . The next section provides more details about the calculations.
Methodology
In agriculture, the elasticity of land use with respect to expected net returns is the percentage change in aggregate land use due to a 1% change in expected net returns. Farmers' decisions of what crops and how many acres to plant are assumed to be based on their expected net returns prior to the planting time. If net farm returns are expected to increase, more land will be converted to agricultural use (Feng and Babcock 2010) . Table 1 shows the composition of cropland in the United States over the past 15 years. The eight major crops included account for almost 95% of the total cropland used. Table 2 shows cropland for Brazil where five major crops account for almost 90% of the total land used. These crops represent a great proportion of land use. Hence their contraction or expansion should capture changes in aggregate land use in both countries.
To obtain a measure of expected net returns, we consider farmers' expectations prior to planting time. In forming expectations we assume that farmers use all information available to them at that time. Thus, expected net returns can be calculated as Expected marketing loan payments are included only for the United States. Other farm programs are assumed not to have a first-order impact on farmers' planting decisions (Babcock 2007; Hart and Babcock 2005 Table 3 shows the futures contracts, the month in which price expectations are formed, and the month in which harvest is valued for the eight U.S. crops and the five Brazilian crops. Note that in Brazil, the expected price for the first-crop corn crop differs from the expected price for the second-crop corn crop to reflect differences in planting time.
The timing convention in Table 3 Table 4 shows the basis between the futures contracts and the actual SAP. To calculate this basis, we assume that as futures get closer to maturity, the futures price converges to the cash price. Therefore, the harvest-time futures price averaged during the last month of the contract can provide an estimate of the cash price. This basis is calculated by subtracting the SAP from the harvest-time futures price during the last month of the contract. By subtracting this basis from the futures price, we should be able to obtain an expected SAP, which is an average of farmers' expected received price. States, the basis is already included in the expected price and no additional basis needs to be applied. Finally, there is no systemic difference between the Brazilian domestic price of corn and the CBOT corn futures contract. Thus, we do not subtract any basis from corn futures contracts. Table 6 shows the basis for Brazil. Table 7 shows the resulting expected harvest-time prices. These prices are assumed to capture farmers' expected prices during the planting season of each crop year. Although prices in Table 5 are in nominal terms and prices in Table 7 are in real terms (year 2000 is the base year), this does not create a problem for the final calculations because all expected net returns are normalized to year 2000 dollars.
Marketing Loan Benefits
Among the three major subsidy programs contained in farm bill legislation, the marketing loan program is the program that is most likely to alter a farmer's planting decision (Hart and Babcock 2005; Babcock 2007 ). Therefore, expected marketing loan payments are accounted for in the U.S. calculations. The details of the marketing loan program can be found in Babcock Table 8 . At the planting time of each year, expected SAP is unknown. Hence, the estimated expected SAP obtained from the previous section is used as an approximation of the expected SAP.
The LDP price gap is obtained from a previous study (Hart and Babcock 2005) . Price gaps for the major commodities are shown in Table 9 . This gap accounts for intra-season price volatility that typically allows farmers to obtain payments even when the SAP indicates that no payments are forthcoming. The fourth column of Table 9 shows the LDP price gap as a percentage of the average planting time quote of the harvest-time futures contract shown in Table   5 .
To calculate the price volatility, we follow Zhang's (2006) approach, which uses the implied volatility from options markets as an estimate of price volatility. Zhang calculates the implied volatility using at-the-money put option on futures. To be more precise, here we use the average of the implied volatility calculated from two at-the-money put options. The options on harvesttime futures are selected daily during the pre-planting months (as shown in Table 1 ). The implied volatility is calculated using the three-month treasury rate. This implied volatility is expected to be the volatility of the futures over the remaining life of the option, which is the time between planting and harvest. Therefore, this volatility is appropriate for our analysis. Table 10 shows the estimated implied volatility.
Finally, the estimated marketing loan benefits are calculated by randomly drawing prices using the estimated SAP as the mean (from Table 5 ) and the implied volatility as the volatility.
For each draw, the marketing loan gain is calculated using the following formula:
(3) Expected benefits = max ( 0 , Loan Rate -(estimated SAP -LDP price gap) 2 ).
We use the average of 20,000 draws for each commodity each year. Table 11 shows the expected marketing loan benefits perceived by the farmer as additional revenue during the pre-planting time.
Expected Crop Yields
To calculate expected crop yields for the United States, we use NASS yields. Expected yields are updated each year by fitting a linear trend to yields from 1980 up to the previous year.
For example, to calculate the expected yield of corn for 1995, we use the actual yield between 1980 and 1994 to construct a trend and project the 1995 yield using this trend. Table 12 shows expected U.S. yields.
The expected yield in Brazil has to be estimated differently because our actual yield data for Brazil only goes back to 1995. For each region, we use the actual yield data between 1995 and 2009 to estimate the yield trend. Then, we apply this trend to project the expected yield for each year between 1995 and 2009. Expected yield in Brazil can be found in Table 13 .
Expected Costs
We use actual variable production costs as our measure of expected costs. These data are taken from FAPRI. Costs for grains in Brazil were based on CONAB and calculated by ICONE, 2 The difference between the estimated SAP and the LDP price gap is the estimated posted county price received by the farmer when receiving the marketing loan gain. Table 14 and   Table 15 show the variable costs in the United States and Brazil, respectively. Variable costs explicitly show an increasing trend in both countries over time.
Results
Plugging in expected crop prices, expected crop yields, marketing loan benefits, and expected costs into equations (1) and (2) There is no set procedure for calculating elasticities directly, as we propose to do here. Figure 3 ), then we get a higher implied elasticity of 0.029. These three different approaches of calculating elasticity all indicate that over the time period examined, the aggregate response of U.S. crop acreage to increased returns is quite inelastic.
To convert the returns elasticity to a price elasticity we need to estimate the elasticity of expected net returns with respect to price. To do this, the change in expected net returns is estimated holding costs and expected yields constant and then increasing each crop price by 10%. The result is divided by 0.1 to obtain the percentage change in expected net returns with respect to a 1% change in price. The average of the two period elasticities is used. 4 For the United States, the impact on expected marketing loan gains was accounted for. From this calculation, the change in expected net returns resulting from a 1% increase in expected price ranges from 1.038% to 1.337%. The implied acreage price elasticity is then calculated by multiplying the acreage elasticity with the expected returns to price elasticity. As shown in Table   16 , the values of the implied acreage elasticity with respect to expected price ranges from a low of 0.007 to a high of 0.029; hence, elasticities in the United States appear to be quite inelastic.
In Brazil, as shown in Figure 2 , although land supply elasticities during the late 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century seem quite responsive to expected net returns, the land response in the more recent period demonstrates a much smaller increase. To determine the magnitude of this difference, we calculate elasticities during the early part of the decade beginning in 2000 as well as the later part of the decade.
First, we consider the five-year period of expected net returns between 1998 and 2002. This period is picked because it contains a massive land expansion and a dramatic increase in returns.
However, Figure 2 shows that land expansion lagged increased returns by about two years. This perhaps reflects the time it took for new roads to be constructed and land to be cleared. Table 17 shows returns elasticities using contemporaneous and two-year lag land use. For the contemporaneous and the two-year lag cases, the arc change in expected net returns is 49.8%
and the arc changes in land use are 16.4% and 22.1%, which implies land elasticities of 0.33 and 0.44, respectively. With a 2.01% increase in expected returns resulting from a 1% increase in expected prices, the implied land-use elasticities with respect to expected price are 0.664 and 0.895 for the contemporaneous and the two-year lag, respectively. As one would expect, the elasticity of land use in Brazil during this expansionary period was much higher than in the United States. elasticities would be smaller if the actual pastureland during this period were decreasing; that is, the amount of the forest converted into cropland and pastureland can also be smaller. If crop returns continue to be high in the future, then we would expect that the elasticity of cropland plus pastureland with a two-year lag would be somewhat higher than the contemporaneous elasticity reported in Table 18 .
Conclusions
This research provides estimates of the response of land use to recent large increases in crop returns. The land-use response, estimated using land-use elasticities with respect to expected returns and price, is crucial for researchers who attempt to determine the amount of land substitutability among forest, crops, and pasture as a result of biofuels expansion and climate The lower elasticity after including the pastureland implies that the increase in cropland is mostly coming from pastureland as opposed to forestland, particularly in the recent period. This finding should help modelers better calibrate their land-use models in Brazil.
In the United States, even with a doubling of expected net returns from about $130 (between 1995 and 2003) to $299 in 2008, only 5 million more acres of crops were planted. Considering this inelastic acreage supply, predictions that significant amounts of cropland will be converted to forestland at a modest CO 2 price of $30 per metric ton (Brown et al. 2010) should be carefully analyzed. 6 In addition, whereas $30 per metric ton may be attractive to farmers given the land rental rates assumed, the price increases resulting from cropland removal may render this value unattractive for afforestation. Finally, more research and discussion should be conducted to explore the policy implications of these estimates on the reliability of current estimates of landuse change from biofuels and climate change legislation. a The LDP price gap is not available for canola. We approximate the LDP price gap for canola using the same % of average futures price from corn and multiply with the average futures price from canola in Table 5 . That is, we use 9% * 0.12 = 0.01. Wheat  17  22  21  23  25  28  25  23  27  30  25  25  26  36  54  25   Upland Cotton  16  16  14  12  17  18  16  24  18  19  24  21  19  22  63  18   Barley  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25  25   Oats  22  28  36  24  36  27  27  33  30  29  25  25  26  28  28  28   Rice  20  20  20  20  20  20  18  20  20  20  26  19  16  20  46  20   Canola  15  15  20  20  20  20  20  21  20  18  24  23  23  22  41 
